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A NEW MODEL FOR MILITARY/NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION RELATIONS IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS
There are currently over 25,000 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) all over the world with more forming continuously. 1 The number of NGOs has doubled since 1978 and is 20 times greater than the total in 1951. 2 NGOs provide critical support and aid valued at over 10 billion dollars annually to some 250 million people. 3 Engaged throughout the world, they are already working in potential trouble spots to which US forces may be deployed. Their vision is long-term, focusing on a conflict, its resolution, and subsequent nation building. The military can ill-afford to avoid maximizing this important international resource, especially in post-conflict operations. The Army's FM 3.0 Operations notes that NGO capabilities are a significant factor that can dramatically reduce military resources and directs that they "must be integrated into planning, preparing, executing, and assessing military operations." differences for the common good. 5 As the number of NGOs continues to grow, this coordination process will become increasingly difficult-eventually yielding inefficient use of limited aid resources, delayed humanitarian relief efforts, and even conflicting objectives in the post-conflict environment. The military must encourage a better post-conflict planning process to enable the best working relationship with the plethora of NGOs. 6 It cannot be the organizational lead of NGOs, as neither the Department of Defense nor the U.S. Government (USG) have any authority over these civilian organizations. In fact, the desire for NGO neutrality and often distrust of the military makes the military an unlikely catalyst for change in the process.
The answer lies in the interagency process. This issue is also joint as all services wrestle with better NGO relationships. The State Department has a large role in the solution as they coordinate U.S. foreign policy and provide other U.S. agencies and ambassadors with the policy lead. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead U.S. agency for interaction with NGOs. 7 It already maintains an extensive computer database of NGO information, available to military planners over the internet, and has habitual working relationships with NGOs through conferences and the aid granting process. 8 USAID can also be the necessary conduit between the military and NGOs to promote improved relations and commitments for post-conflict operations. It is already the major player, through private, self-governing, not-for-profit organizations dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.
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Critical to note in both definitions is the lack of accountability of NGOs to any American governmental agency, the U.S. or any other military, or the United Nations. These organizations are, however, on the battlefield, answering only to their own headquarters in response to humanitarian or environmental crises.
The military must avail itself of the valuable capabilities that NGOs bring to the postconflict environment. Effective cooperation and synchronization of NGO humanitarian efforts are critical to USG recovery efforts. Because of increased deployments and an inability to leave any committed area quickly, the military needs to maximize NGO abilities and resources after a conflict, so that it can redeploy its own assets or deploy to other theaters of operation. The U.S.
military has exercised post-conflict NGO coordination in Iraq (Operation Provide Comfort), Kosovo, and Afghanistan. The military was also involved with NGOs in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, although these were not post-conflict operations in which U.S. forces were engaged in combat. Even though much of this research project would be applicable in those instances as well, we will focus on the post-U.S. conflict scenario, emphasizing an environment in which NGOs become involved concurrently with U.S. forces or one from which they were expelled and now are re-entering. 18 Present at any conflict termination will be the inevitable destruction of homes, governmental structures, and food production. In Afghanistan, the USG solved these problems and shortages quickly under the inevitable scrutiny of the world press, as it will need to in any future contingency. For the Afghans, much of this aid was channeled through NGOs for food (319,000 metric tons), winter clothing issues, and shelter and heating assistance in the form of blankets, coal, plastic sheeting, tents, and stoves. This immediate aid fulfilled much of the emergency food and housing needs, averting a serious humanitarian disaster. The U.S.
military, NGOs, and USAID also conducted and financed infrastructure repairs to include fixing water-supply systems, rebuilding roads and bridges, repairing housing, drilling new wells, performing agriculture projects, distributing some 30,000 radios, and re-opening schools. The State Department also gave 3.1 million to RONCO Consulting Corporation to train Afghans in demining and to equip them with detectors, ambulances, protective gear, and radios. This NGO-provided training frees Special Forces trainers to perform other necessary missions in country. Because of the abundance of mines in their country, demining will remain a major NGO activity in Afghanistan for years.
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ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT MILITARY/NGO DOCTRINE
Having reviewed the current Afghanistan military/NGO interaction and roles, it is
profitable to review where current military doctrine stands on NGO relationships. The 1990s provided numerous contingencies that involved NGOs. These included relief efforts in Northern
Iraq; humanitarian assistance in Bangladesh, Somalia and Rwanda; and peace operations in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. These contingencies led to many academic studies and formulation of the current military doctrine. Because of the complex NGO interaction in the above contingencies and a desire to afford commanders latitude in future contingencies, the doctrine is broad and somewhat vague. It is not directive and relies on operators to formulate the interaction.
One of the key joint documents to emerge out of these experiences was 
ACADEMIC MILITARY/NGO PROPOSALS
There were numerous studies on military/NGO relationships in the late 1990s. Table 2 ). These academic studies investigated the crises up 
INVOLVEMENT OF U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID)
Upon reviewing current joint doctrine and the various academic proposals, the military is clearly an interagency player in the post-conflict period. USAID already is assuming a leadership role with NGOs and the recovery effort. The reality of the contingencies in the 1990s
and Afghanistan confirm the centrality of USAID in any humanitarian operation in which U.S.
forces are involved. USAID is leading by directing and controlling USG aid money--often having other world relief monies follow the U.S. lead. The USG must refine the interagency process and establish doctrine to be more proactive in post-conflict recovery. USAID, working in conjunction with the State Department, ambassadors, and DoD, must be ready for hostility termination and subsequent relief operations. USAID must galvanize the NGO community, so all participants in humanitarian efforts will better comprehend each other's roles and missions. would probably be very concerned with the accuracy of their data on this website. The NGO incentive to attend the conference is to develop better rapport with PVC, the USAID primary grant provider, and OFDA, the crisis director with whom the NGO will interface on the ground.
Summary of Proposed
The military planners could then plan on using these committed NGOs to fulfill as many critical post-conflict relief functions as possible while USAID could begin planning the longer term (after 30 days from conflict termination) developmental relief tasks that are important for ultimate peace and recovery. The proposed conference creates better integration between USAID, the military, and NGOs, promoting better horizontal relationships within all organizations and leading to improved post-conflict operations in future crises. After the NGO capability is determined at the conference, each NGO would then be grouped into one of four possible military relationships for post-conflict operations based on their view of U.S. national interests and their overall capabilities. These four categories include:
NEW MODEL FOR MILITARY/NGO RELATIONS
reliance, assistance, autonomous, or adversarial. They are critical to the model because they dictate the relationship that the military planner and USAID will use in incorporating the NGO into the post-conflict plan and in determining the military support required by the NGO.
The reliance relationship is one in which the NGO depends on the military for support.
Without it, it is incapable of accomplishing its mission. Consequently, the NGO is supportive of military recovery efforts and wants military support in large measures to accomplish its part in Restoration of Government/Police NGO 9 NGO 14, 15
CONCLUSION
The USG must implement a directive model to replace the current informal planning arrangement for NGO employment. Defining the critical relief functions (CRFs) in which the military will become involved in the immediate 30 days of the post-conflict phase will provide a clearer view for all agencies participating in recovery operations. To avoid further military involvement in nation building and an over commitment of limited military assets, the CRFs will enable civilian leadership to focus military resources on only the most severe humanitarian problems while immediately directing NGOs into the recovery efforts. Many will want the military to be involved across the spectrum in every conceivable nation building task, but with the War on Terrorism and limited defense dollars, the military will need to rewind continually to be ready for the next contingency. It cannot remain as a security or humanitarian force across the globe, suffering a form of strategic attrition. The second part of the model, the four military/NGO relationships, will articulate the military support requirements that the NGO will require to perform its mission. This pre-crisis openness will help all parties realize shortcomings in the logistical plan and ensure proper military assets are available in theater when and where they are needed. NGOs not willing to participate in internationally recognized forums will be suspect of an adversarial relationship, possibly disqualifying them for any U.S., European, coalition, or UN grant monies.
The proposed annual USAID/military/NGO conference will draw this directive model together and formalize it for all participants. Knowing that contingencies will continue and that
NGOs will remain critical players in post-conflict recovery operations, the interagency and NGO interaction is critical to ensure continued recognition of each others' attributes, limitations, and goals. Recording and expanding these capabilities and desires on existing USAID/PVC databases will aid military and NGO planners with recovery efforts. The final matrix planning tool will enable the military planner to summarize and to articulate the military and NGO support required by the combatant command for post-conflict operations.
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